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DEDUCTING BUSINESS EXPENSES DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY AS "ORDINARY AND
NECESSARY": CAMMARANO v. UNITED
STATES AND A BIT BEYOND
WHETHER profitmaking enterprises may treat the amounts they spend to
encourage governmental policies favorable to their businesses as business ex-
penses, deductible on corporate and individual income tax returns, represents
an important facet of a recurrent national issue.1 The Internal Revenue Code's
cryptic business-expense provision, section 162(a), makes deductible all spend-
ing which is "ordinary and necessary in carrying on a trade or business."
2
Treasury regulations have long interpreted this language as excluding amounts
spent "for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, [and] the
exploitation of propaganda other than trade advertising."-3 The Supreme Court
first passed upon the validity of these regulations in the 1941 case of Textile
Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner.4 It unanimously upheld the disallowance
of deduction of public-relations and legal-research expenses incurred by a cor-
porate taxpayer whose only business appeared to be lobbying before Congress
pursuant to a contingent-fee contract entered into with German tex-tile inter-
ests to obtain legislation returning sixty million dollars in properties seized by
the United States during World War I. The Court's theory was that these
expenses, even though clearly linked to business profitability, were still not
"ordinary and necessar*" because that language in the Code is sufficiently
ambiguous to admit of the longstanding interpretation which the Treasury
regulations had placed upon it. And the Court found no policy of Congress
1. See ANDmaws, ComoRATox GsxvnG 180-81 (1952); BLAISDELu, AmZtEncAx Dc-
mocRAcy UxDE PazssuRE (1957) ; ScHmrmrmssm, THE LOBBYISrs 146-68 (1951). Several
congressional investigations have been concerned with business expenditures in the political
arena. See S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1957) (digesting reports of earlier
business lobbying investigations). See generally Comment, 56 YALE I.J. 304 (1947). In
1958 business organizations filing under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act reported
spending $2,047,657.41 for directly contacting Congressmen, 15 CONG. Q. AiAIANAc 680
(1959), undoubtedly only a small portion of the total amount spent to influence Government
policy, id. at 678; Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 325-27 (1947); see H.R. RExP. No. 3137, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R REp. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950) (at least R32
million expended by business for legislative activity between January 1947, and May 1950).
2. mIT. REv. CDE OF 1954, § 162(a); see Deputy v. DuPont 308 U.S. 488 (1940);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
3. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 562 (1919) (now Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1959)). In sub-
stantially the same terms, these regulations have applied to corporate expenses since 1918
and to individual business expenses since 1938. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 503 n.6 (1959). As early as 1915, the Treasury had ruled that amounts expended
for lobbying were not ordinary and necessary. T.D. 2137, 17 TaEAs. DMn Irr. REv. 48,
57,58 (1915).
4. 314U.S.326 (1941).
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which "contravened" this interpretation.5 Although it therefore validated the
regulations as applied, the -Court characterized the taxpayer's arrangement,
according to which it was to receive a percentage of the value of the property
returned, as falling within a "family of contracts to which the law has given
no sanction" 6-citing cases holding contingent-fee lobbying contracts void as
against public policy 7-and as tending -to spread "insidious influences through
legislative halls" ;8 and the decision has been viewed by some commentators 1,
and, seemingly, by the Court itself in a later dictum 10 as limited to cases in-
volving comparable contingent-fee lobbying before Congress. But the courts
of appeals and the Tax Court have subsequently interpreted the decision more
broadly, and have upheld the Treasury regulation as applied to a wide variety
of expenditures."
5. Id. at 338.
6. Id. at 339.
7. Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 4,11
(1874).
8. 314 U.S. at 338. Some disagreement exists on whether such arrangements should
be unenforceable without further inquiry. Compare S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Seks.
79 (1957), with H.R. REP. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1951).
9. See Lurie, Deductibility of Illegal Expenses, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON Fi. TAX.
1189 (1953) ; Spiegel, Deductibility of Lobbying, Initiative and Referendum Expenses: A
Prdblem for Congressional Consideration, 45 CAliF. L. Ray. 1 (1957); Note, 54 HAlv.
L. REv. 698 (1941).
10. In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), the Court
noted that the business expense regulations involved in Textile Mills reflected "an ad-
ministrative distinction 'between legitimate business expenses and those arising from that
family of contracts to which the law has given no sanction."' Id. at 34. And in Com-
missioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), the Court cited Textile Mills in support
of the proposition that "one who has incurred expenses for certain types of lobbying and
political pressure activities with a view to influencing federal legislation has been denied
a deduction." Id. at 473. (Emphasis added.) But see Webster, Deductibility of Lobbying
and Related Expenses, 42 A.B.A.J. 175 (1956) ("Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 US. 90
(1952) makes it clear that Textile Mills is based not on considerations of public policy
but on the administrative interpretation of the statutory business expense section.").
11. American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1953)
(contributions by a corporation for activity designed to obtain revisions in the tax laws) ;
Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952) (same); Wni. T.
Stover Co., 27 T.C. 434 (1956) (reimbursement by a hospital supply corporation of the
expenses of a newsman in flying to the United Kingdom to obtain background for articles
opposing socialized medicine) ; Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. 49 (1956) (contributions to asso-
ciation operated to oppose referendum measure); The Mosby Hotel Co., 23 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 920 (1954) (contributions by retail liquor corporations for a publicity campaign
to prevent a state legislature from putting a prohibition referendum on the state election
ballot) ; Smokey Mountains Beverage Co., 22 T.C. 1249 (1954) (corporate expenses for
the appearance of its president before state legislative committees) ; The McClintock-
Trunkey Co., 19 T.C. 297 (1952) (corporate contributions to lobbying organizations and
to the Washington Wholesalers' Beer Association which was active in opposing an initiative
then before the legislature) ; Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mere.
893 (1950) (expenses for attorney to testify before congressional committee in opposition to
federal legislation) ; Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947) (payments by corporation
to its Washington attorney for keeping it informed concerning current legislative develop.
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The Decision
The regulations did not come before the Supreme Court again for almost
twenty years, but when they did the Treasury was sustained in sweeping
terms. In Cainnarano v. United States,'" decided in early 1959, the Treasury
had disallowed deductions claimed on the individual returns of two partners
in a wholesale beer distributing business. The deductions were for 86 dollars
contributed by the partnership to a campaign opposing a referendum in the
State of Washington which would have placed all retail sales of wine and beer
exclusively in the hands of the state and would have seriously affected the
wholesale distributing business. The contributions were made to a separate
trust fund set up by a tax-exempt trade association of beer wholesalers, and
the trust fund's total receipts of 53,500 dollars were funneled into an industry-
wide war chest of 231,257 dollars. In F. Strauss & Sons v. Conmmissioner,'3
consolidated with Caminarano, the Treasury ,had denied a 9,000 dollar ,le-
duction taken by a corporation, whose business was wholesaling liquor, for a
contribution to a nonexempt corporation created by nine liquor dealers to co-
ordinate their efforts and pool their aggregate contributions of 126,265 dollars
in attempting to defeat an Arkansas prohibition referendum. All of the con-
tributions in question in both cases were spent for the sole purpose of influenc-
ing the voters of the state through widespread advertising and other publicity.
The Court saw no distinction between the individual and corporate deductions
and the separate regulations applicable thereto. It had no difficulty in finding
that the contributions were within the regulations' scope by rejecting, inter
alia, the taxpayers' assertion that initiative proposals are not "legislation."' 4
The major portion of the opinion is devoted to rejecting the taxpayers' con-
tention that since adoption of .the referendums would have destroyed their
businesses, expenses in opposing them met any reasonable test of "ordinary
and necessary" and that, therefore, the Treasury regulations were invalid as
applied to those expenses.' 5 The Court reiterated its Textile Mills view that
the regulations were a proper interpretation of an ambiguous Code provision.' 0
It emphasized that the regulations had "acquired the force of law"' 7 because
Congress had "repeatedly" reenacted the Code "without the slightest sugges-
tion that the policy does other than precisely conform to its intent."' 8 This
meats affecting taxpayer's business); Mary E. Bellingrath, 49 B.T.A. 89 (1942) (contri-
butions underwriting opposition to proposed legislation).
12. 358 U.S. 498 (1959); see Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax
Deductions for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Ray. 365 (1959) ; The Supreme Conrt.
1958 Term, 73 HAv. L. REv. 84, 191 (1959); 58 McCH. L. RE%. 142 (1959) ; Note, 46
VA. L. REv. 112 (1960).
13. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
14. Id. at 504.
15. Brief for Petitioners, p. 15, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
16. 358 U.S. at 508.
17. Id. at 510.
18. Id. at 508-09.
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assumption of reenactment was warranted, said the Court, because of the
"unambiguous regulatory language," the regulations' "continuous existence"
since 1918, and the -fact that they had been "consistently construed" ,by the
courts. 19
The Court also disposed of the contention, premised upon Commissioner
v. Heininger,20 that expenses so clearly related to 'business survival and prof-
itability can be disallowed only on grounds of a "sharply defined" national or
state policy announced outside the revenue laws.21 In rejecting this argument,
the Court seemed to be articulating a new rationale and stating that even if
the expenses met the "ordinary and necessary" test, denial of deduction was
proper because the regulations "themselves constitute an expression of a sharp-
ly defined national policy, further demonstration of which may be found in
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code."12 2 The other sections of the Code
referred to, which had received only footnote attention in Textile Mills,2 3 were
those withholding exempt status from, and denying deductibility of contribu-
tions to, charitable-educational organizations which engage in substantial legis-
lative activity.2 In thus concluding that Congress had evidenced an intention
to prevent public subsidization of legislative activity through tax deductions,"
the Court followed, at least in part, a notion of a congressional policy of
"tax equilibrium" in the political arena requiring that deductions not 'be al-
lowed which would be unavailable to taxpayers undertaking similar activities
not related to trades or businesses. 26
19. Id. at 511.
20. 320 U.S. 467 (1943) (legal expenses incurred in resisting issuance by Postmaster
General of fraud order accorded deductibility). The rule enunciated in this opinion had
been followed in a number of decisions. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); J. Rossman
Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
21. 358 U.S. at 508.
22. Ibid.
23. 314 U.S. 326, 338 n.18 (1941).
24. 358 U.S. at 512; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3).
25. 358 U.S. at 512. The Court enunciated this proposition by adopting a statement
made by Judge Learned Hand in Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
26. See Brief for Respondents, p. 36, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959) ("[A] tax equilibrium exists. If the expenses of the business community were
to become deductible, this tax equilibrium would be upset. While the business community
could deduct their expenses, all others could not."). Expenditures designed to promote
the political-legislative ends of professional groups, technically outside the "business com-
munity," are presumably included within the Treasury's notion of "expenses of the busi-
ness community" and are subsumed by the concept set forth in text of expenses "related
to trades or businesses." Contributions to labor and farm organizations-extremely active
legislatively, see McCune, Farmers in Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 41; Carey, Organized
Labor in Politics, id. at 52; 15 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 678 (1959), and exempt from income
tax, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) 5-are similarly deductible only as business expenses.
See I.T. 2888, XIV-1 Cum. BULL 54 (1935). All such expenditures are not treated
separately in this Comment which, like Cammarano, focuses on deductions claimed by
businessmen.
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The Decision's Rationale: A Brief Critique
The notion that Congress had adopted the Treasury's position by reenacting
the "ordinary and necessary" provision several times without change consti-
tutes the foundation of the opinion. The reenactment doctrine, which rests on
the doubtful assumption that Congress' repeated reenactment of a statute is
"taken with knowledge of the construction placed upon the section by the
official charged with its administration," 7 has been vigorously criticized in
the past 28 and is particularly questionable as applied in Cammarano. Most
doubtful is the Court's view that the regulations had been "consistently con-
strued." As noted in Camnmrano, only the reenactments which occurred prior
to the expenditures involved in that case could "conclusively demonstrate," if
any reenactment could, "the propriety of an administrative and judicial inter-
pretation and application."2 9 But at the time of those reenactments, the last
of which occurred in 1939, there did exist, to a considerable degree, the "con-
flict between administrative and judicial interpretation of the statute" which,
according to Canmarano, would lead to the conclusion that "no reliable infer-
ence as to Congress' intent" could -be drawn from reenactment.3 0 Prior to the
1939 reenactment, which preceded the 1941 Textilc Mills decision, only the
Ninth Circuit in a single 1936 case 3' and the Fourth Circuit in Tc.rlile
Mills 3'2 itself had unequivocally relied upon the regulations, while the Board
of Tax Appeals, which decided most of the earlier cases, ignored the regula-
tions for the most part and often found expenses for political-legislative pur-
poses "ordinary and necessary: '-3 M%'oreover, if the 1954 reenactment can be
27. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 269, 273 (1933)
(cited by the Caninarano Court, 358 U.S. at 511).
28. See, e.g., Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problemn, 54 HAti. L REv.
398 (1941) ; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE
L.J. 660 (1940) ; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Incomne,
Estate and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L REv. 556 (1940). The doctrine was argued before the
Textile Mills Court but not relied upon in the decision. Brief for Respondent, p. 14,
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
29. 358 U.S. at 510.
30. Id. at 510-11.
31. Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936). In an earlier
decision, the same court, in denying deduction of contributions to a lobbying organization,
adverted to, but did not rely upon, the regulations. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v.
Commissioner, 69 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1934).
32. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F2d 62 (4th Cir. 1940).
33. Allowing deduction: Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 20 B.T.A. 796 (1930);
Best Brewer Co., 16 B.T.A. 1354 (1929); G. T. Wofford, 15 B.T.A. 1225 (1929); Los
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 18 B.T.A. 168 (1929); Hirsch-Weis Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 796
(1928); George Ringler & Co., 10 B.T.A. 1134 (1928); Independent Brewing Co., 4
B.T.A. 870 (1926). See also Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F.2d 10-7 (5th Cir. 1931); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl. 629, 52 F.2d 1040 (1931). Denying deduction: H. R.
Cullen, 41 B.T.A. 1054 (1940); Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B.T.A. 578 (1937) (not mentioning
the regulations but citing one decision which rested on them and two which did not);
Mrs. Win. P. Kyne, 35 B.T.A. 202 (1936) (mentioning the regulations only secondarily);
The Adler Co., 10 B.T.A. 849 (1928).
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thought to indicate retroactive congressional approval of the regulations as
applied to pre-1954 expenditures, the Court's broad view of that reenactment
--"significant as indicating satisfaction with the interpretation consistently
given the statute by the Regulations . . ." 4-would not seem warranted.
Textile Mills, because of its emphasis upon the contingent-fee nature of the
arrangement involved, hardly indicates with clarity an end to the prior judi-
cial-administrative conflict in interpretation. Only the lower courts, in some
eight decisions rendered in the period from 1941 to 1954, clearly held that this
era of conflict was over.35 Even if Congress was aware of so few holdings,83
that body may have nonetheless thought that only a narrow view of Textilc
Mills correctly and definitively interpreted the regulations.3
The doctrine that Congress had reenacted the Treasury's position seems
particularly tenuous when used to disallow the expenses in Camniarano; the
Treasury acquiesced in a 1944 Tax Court decision 88 allowing deduction of ex-
penditures incurred to influence state-wide voting on a state constitutional
amendment until May 22, 1958,30 the day certiorari was granted in Strauss.40
And the Court's footnote, stating that the "Commissioner and the Tax Court
have been entirely consistent in their position that expenditures connected with
initiative-as in the present cases-are not deductible,"4 1 seems unpersua-
sive.42 Of the cases cited 'by the Court, the two Tax Court cases ill fact ill
volved attempts to influence legislative decisions, not state-wide initiatives ;43
in one Ninth Circuit case which did involve an initiative the court did not
rely upon the regulations ;44 and the other appellate case in which expenditures
34. 358 U.S. at 510.
35. See cases cited note 11 supra.
36. Cf. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 37-39, Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314
U.S. 326 (1941).
37. See S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 229-31 (1957) (staff memorandtuln
indicating doubt as to the correct interpretation).
38. Luther Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944), acq., 1944 Cum. Buu.. 26.
39. Rev. Rul. 58-255, 1958-1 Cum. BuuL. 91.
40. Brief for Petitioners, p. 47 n.19, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959).
41. 358 U.S. at 507 n.10.
42. The Commissioner certainly had not been consistent. He had issued special rulings
to a North Carolina taxpayer and to a Colorado taxpayer according deductibility to ex-
penditures made to defeat prohibition measures in those states. Record, pp. 39-43, Cam-
marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
43. In McClintock-Trunkey Co., 19 T.C. 297 (1952), the taxpayer had contributed
to the Washington Wholesalers' Beer Association which at that time was attempting to
persuade the legislature not to put a proposed initiative measure on the state-wide ballot.
In Mosby Hotel Co., 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 920 (1954), the contributions in issue were
made to an organization "formed for the purpose of conducting a campaign to repeal
the prohibition laws of the State of Kansas," laws which had been enacted by the legisla-
ture and which, presumably, could be repealed by that body. These cases are cited by the
Camnarano Court at 358 U.S. at 506, 507 n.10.
44. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 676, 681 (9th Cir.
1934) (cited in Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 506).
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were made to influence voters in an initiative was decided in 1956, after the
expenditures in the instant case and after the 1954 reenactment., Nor does
the asserted "unambiguous language" or the "continuous existence" of the
regulations lend much greater support to the Court's argument that Congress
consciously adopted the regulations. During most of the period since their
promulgation in 1918, and at the time of Cammarano, the regulations were
listed under charitable contributions rather than under business deductions and
bore the title "Contributions or Gifts,""MG and lower courts have not found
Code provisions governing charitable-educational organizations, virtually iden-
tical with these regulations,47 "unambiguous." 48 Taking all these factors to-
gether, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reenactment doctrine does not
properly apply to clothe the Treasury regulations with the force of law.
In addition, and for the same reasons, the regulations cannot be the basis
of a "sharply defined national policy" requiring disallowance of the Cania-
rano expenditures. Also open to dispute is the Court's view that the charit-
able-education sections of the Code further demonstrate such a policy. True,
the Code specifically denies exempt status to charitable-educational organiza-
tions engaging to a substantial degree in certain political-legislative activities 4"
and disallows deduction of contributions to such organizations,r0 apparently
45. Revere Racing Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F2d 816 (1st Cir. 1956) (cited by the Cam-
marano Court, 358 US. at 506). Moreover, this decision placed principal reliance not
on the regulations but on a rule that expenses designed to give a possible opportunity to
do business in the future were not ordinary and necessary, a rule derived from McDonald
v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944) (expenses by an individual taxpayer in his judgeship
election campaign are a capital investment not deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense). In Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. 49 (1956), however, a case not cited by
the Caminarano Court, a deduction for contributions to an association opposing a referen-
dum before the voters was denied.
46. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 357-58 (1941). The
regulations before the Cammarano Court were §§ 29.23(0)-l and 29.23(9)-l of Trea!urq
Regulation 111 promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The regulations
under the 1954 Code, adopted April 1958, by T.D. 6291, are listed in Treasury Regulations
§ 1.162-15 (c) under § 162 of the Code, the "ordinary and necessary" business expense sectiun.
47. Compare INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(c)3, 170(c), uth regulations cited
note 46 supra.
48. See the varying treatment accorded the League of Women Voters in League of
Women Voters v. United States, No. 232-56, Ct. Cl., January 20, 1960; Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Henriette T.
Noyes, 31 B.T.A. 121 (1934). Compare Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th
Cir. 1955), with Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940). The courts
have had similar difficulties under provisions exempting charitable-educational organiza-
tions from social security requirements; since 1954, 501(c)3 organizations have been so
exempted. Ixr. RFm CODE OF 1954, § 3121 (b)9(B) ; see Better Business Bureau v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) ; Lord's Day Alliance v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.
Pa. 1946); National Campaign Comm. v. Rogan, 69 F. Supp. 679 (S.D. Cal. 1945);
Massachusetts Civic League v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 346 (D. Mass. 1945).
49. I-r. R . CoDE OF 1954, § 501(c)3.
50. IxT. Ray. CoDE OF 1954, § 170(c).
1960] 1023
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
indicating a congressional view that organizations lose their charitable-educa-
tional character when they engage in substantial political-legislative activities.
But the separate treatment in the Code of business leagues and trade associa-
tions and contributions to them contains no such limitation on political-legis-
lative activities. 51 Since these organizations have for decades been notoriously
active lobbyists, 52 the omission of such a limitation is pointed and may be
viewed as manifesting a congressional design to allow business deductions
irrespective of legislative-political activities.
Furthermore, it would not seem possible to locate a "sharply defined" con-
gressional or state policy outside the revenue laws which would warrant the
Cammarano disallowance.5 3 The Treasury asserted in its brief in Cammarano
that various congressional committee reports evidencing concern with the mag-
nitude of business outlays for lobbying buttressed the theory that 'Congress
had adopted a policy of "tax equilibrium." 4 These reports, however, were of
investigations looking toward the enactment or improvement of the Regulation
of Lobbying Act, which provides for the registration of lobbyists and dis-
closure of their expenses,u5 not toward the effectuation of any policy against
public subsidization through the tax laws. And since Congress failed to im-
pose more stringent controls on lobbying, it is equally tenable to assert that
Congress would not approve the additional inhibition imposed 'by denial of
tax deductibility for legislative-political expenses.
Nor would the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits contributions
by corporations to support federal election campaigns,50 seem to delineate a
"sharply defined" congressional policy bearing on the Camnnarano expendi-
tures. Although one premise upon which this act is apparently 'based-that the
voter is 'better able to act without propaganda distractions ''-might seem to
51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)3.
52. See ScHmFurcnEssE, THE LOBBYISTS 101 (1951); Lenhart & Schriftgiesser,
Managenwnt in Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 32. In 1959, for example, several of these
organizations regarded the enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 as a substantial victory. 15 CONG. Q. ALMAxAc 674-75 (1959). They
also claimed several legislative victories in 1958. 14 CONG. Q. ALmANAc 622 (1958).
53. Under prior decisions, it appeared that such a policy could be found only outside the
revenue laws. See Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952) ; Commissioner v. Heininger,
320 U.S. 467 (1943).
54. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 32-35, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959) ; note 26 supra.
55. 60 Stat. 840-41 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 264, 267 (1958); see Futor, An Analysis
of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 FED. B.J. 366 (1949) ; Zeller, The Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act, 42 A.t. POL. Sci. Rzv. 239 (1948) ; Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 304 (1947).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958) ; see Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election
Finance: A Case of Misguided Public Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975 (1953) ; Bottoinly,
Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. REv. 331 (1950) ; Hazard, It Takes
Money To Get Elected, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1960, p. 92. Contributions by labor unions
are also prohibited.
57. See Nye, The Influetce of Money in Political Campaigns, 74 CONG. REc. 2158
(1931) ; OSTROGORS i, DEMOCRACv AND THE PARTY SYsTEm 223-24 (1926).
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support a contrary position, another purpose for the congressional prohibition,
protection of shareholders from expenditures of corporate funds for causes
with which they may not agree,5s appears applicable only to campaign con-
tributions, which underwrite the entire range of policies advocated by the can-
didate or party to which contributions are made. Hence, expenditures to defeat
a referendum, which concerned a single well-defined issue clearly in the in-
terest of all shareholders, would not run counter to this second purpose. The
prohibition on corporate campaign contributions seems also designed to pre-
vent the purchase of political favors by wealthy interests,59 and this policy
would not seem frustrated by Caimnarano-type expenditures designed to in-
fluence referendums which have no such effect upon elected officials. Mfore-
over, because of free speech guarantees, such expenditures probably could not
constitutionally be brought within the prohibitions of the Corrupt Practices
Act.60 Finally, the expenditures in Cantnarano (although not in Strauss)
were 'by individuals to which a major aspect of the rationale of the Corrupt
Practices Act-diminishing the political power of the managers of retained
corporate earnings "--is inapplicable.
In Arkansas, a "sharply defined" policy against the deduction of the Strauss
expenditures might 'have been found in a statute prohibiting any corporation
or corporations, either individually or collectively, from expending more than
25,000 dollars in any initiative campaign. 62 The deduction of expenditures
made in violation of this statute, as the Strauss expenditures well might have
been,63 would, as did the deduction claimed in the leading case of Tank Truck
Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner," "frustrate sharply defined . . state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct ... ,,11 But the State of Washington,
where Caminarano itself arose, has no such statute, and, perhaps in the interest
of nationwide uniformity, the Court did not narrow its decision to affect only
58. See S. REP. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 62 (1949).
59. Nye, supra note 57. Contributions may be made in return for a definite promise
of political favor. See KEY, PoLrrics, PARTIES, AND PaEssuRE GRoups 469-73 (2d ed.
1948); Overacker, Dirty Money and Dirty Politics, New Republic, Sept. 11, 1950, p. 11.
60. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (concurring opinion of
Douglas, J.) ; see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). See generally Sunder-
land, Taxation of Free Speech, 26 U. CHL L. RE V. 109 (1958).
61. See Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of
Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. RLv. 975 (195a). See also HaRIN , THE POLITICS OF
DrmocRAcy 341 (1940).
62. AR. STAT. ANx. § 3-1303 (1956). For a comprehensive survey of state legislation
dealing with corrupt practices, see Bottomly, Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30
B.U.L. REV. 331 (1950).
63. Although the statute seems not to have been judicially construed, the corporations
in Strauss, acting collectively, spent 126,265.84 dollars through an intermediary for a
"campaign ... in conection with the submission of . . . [a] law . . .to the vote of the
people by initiation.. . ." 358 U.S. at 502; see ARn. STAT. AN. § 3-1303 (19F6). For
such expenditures above the maximum $25,000 the statute imposes criminal sanctions.
64. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
65. Id. at 33.
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initiative or referendum expenditures in those few states having statutes simi-
lar to the Arkansas provision.6
THE SCOPE OF CAMMARANO
The Treasury has reacted to Camniarano by issuing a new set of regula-
tions, which more fully elaborate the basic terms of those which the Court had
before it in CammaranoG7 and, apparently, by adopting a course of more
vigorous enforcement. 8 It may thus be anticipated that the principles an-
nounced by the Court in that case will be further tested, especially since the
scope of the decision cannot readily be predicted. Some of the language of the
Court is exceedingly broad, such as its quotation from an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand declaring that "political agitation as such is outside the statute,
however innocent the aim .... Controversies of that sort must be conducted
without public subvention . "..."69 This and other language 70 has been viewed
66. See Bottomly, supra note 62, at 350 (appendix collecting state statutes). This
Arkansas statute and those similar to it may well raise first amendment problems. See
note 60 supra.
67. Expenditures for lobbying purposes, for the promotion or defeat of legislation, for
political campaign purposes (including the support of or opposition to any candidate
for public office), or for carrying on propaganda (including advertising) related to
any of the foregoing purposes are not deductible from gross income. For example.
the cost of advertising to promote or defeat legislation or to influence the public
with respect to the desirability or undesirability of proposed legislation is not de-
ductible as a business expense, even though the legislation may directly affect the
taxpayer's business. On the other hand, expenditures for institutional or "good
will" advertising which keeps the taxpayer's name before the public are generally
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses provided the expenditures
are related to the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in the future,
For example, a deduction will ordinarily be allowed for the cost of advertising
which keeps the taxpayer's name before the public in connection with encouraging
contributions to such organizations as the Red Cross, the purchase of United
States Savings Bonds, or participation in similar causes. In like fashion, expendi
tures for advertising which present views on economic, financial, social, or other
subjects of a general nature but which do not involve any of the activities specified
in the first sentence of this subparagraph are deductible if they otherwise meet the
requirements of the regulations under section 162.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1) (1959). These regulations were finally adopted by T.D.
6435, 1960 INT. Rav. BuL. No. 4, at 7. It had originally been proposed, 21 Fed. Reg. 5095
(1956), withdrawn, and reproposed, 24 Fed. Reg. 7584 (1959).
68. See Spofford, The Impact of Some Recent Developments in Ta.xe Litigation and
Legislation, 37 TAXES 1068, 1069 (1959) ; Washington Tax Talk, 37 TAxES 1036 (1959).
Lobbying groups have expressed considerable concern over the possible impact of the
new regulations on their activities. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1959, p. 83, col. 3; Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 30, 1959, p. 1, col. 5.
69. 358 U.S. at 512, quoting Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930)
(contributions to the American Birth Control League, which claimed tax exempt statu4
as a charitable organization, not deductible). The Treasury had quoted the same language
from Slee in its brief. Brief for Respondents, p. 35.
70. The Court went on to state that "the Regulations here contested appear to us
to be but a further expression of the same sharply defined policy." 358 U.S. at 512.
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by some as an unqualified endorsement of the theory of a far-reaching "tax
equilibrium" policy.71 Insofar as the Court relied on a finding of a "sharply
defined" policy within the tax laws, its opinion seems potentially broader than
previous business-expense cases resting upon a finding of such a policy in a
specific declaration of Congress or a state outside the revenue laws ;72 the
Court presumably is itself free to define the policy's outer limits. Insofar as
the opinion adopts the Treasury regulations as "the law," its full reach is per-
haps as uncertain as the necessarily vague terms in which those regulations
are cast.
73
The scope of the decision must be assessed in light of the nature of business
expenditures in the legislative and political arena. Such expenditures may
vary Nidely in accordance with (1) the stage of the political process at which
influence is sought to be exerted, (2) the means of exerting influence adopted,
and (3) the organizational structure through which these means are attempted.
Thus, businesses may seek election or defeat of individual candidates or parties
in state or federal balloting, adoption or rejection of a particular measure by
a state legislature or by Congress, success or failure of a state referendum,
the issuance of a ruling or order of a state or federal administrative agency,
or construction, enforcement, or nonenforcement of a given measure by state
or federal executive officers. The method adopted may include traditional
forms of direct lobbying before legislators or other governmental officers, ad-
vertising or publicity campaigns directed to the public generally, testimony and
other formal appearances before legislative or executives bodies, and prepara-
tion of research and ostensibly factual material for presentation to particular
legislators and officers of the government or to the public. The channel
through which the expenditure is made may be a nonexempt organization
created by several enterprises for the purpose of attaining the objective sought,
an exempt charitable-educational organization, business league or trade asso-
ciation ivth other continuing functions, or, finally, a single enterprise may
devote its own resources and personnel to achieve the objective. This Com-
ment will seek to examine these various possibilities and suggest how they
will or should be treated in the wake of Caninarano and the new Treasury
regulations.
Stage of the Political Process
Electoral
Although Cammarano, like Textile Mills, did not involve expenses for elec-
tion campaigns, the regulations before the Court have since 1918 stated that
71. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying1
Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Rnv. 365 (1959); 58 lICH. L. Rzv. 142 (1959); Note, 4 VA. I.,
Rzv. 112 (1960) ; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
72. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952) ; see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
38 (1958). See generally Bmrrx, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND G nr TAxATio::
249-51 (2d ed. 1958).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (c) (1959).
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"contributions for campaign expenses" are not ordinary and necessary.74 The
post-Cantinarano regulations would disallow "expenditures . .. for political
campaign purposes (including the support of or opposition to any candidate
for public office) . ... ,,7 This broader statement would seem fully justified
since support of candidates and parties appears insufficiently related to 'busi-
ness survival and profitability to warrant its 'being characterized as ordinary
and necessary.7 6 The favorable impact upon the business donor of expenditures
for the purpose of electing or defeating certain legislators or officials is more
speculative than are expenditures designed, for example, to influence the out-
come of a referendum. The donor's candidates may not achieve sufficient con-
trol of the machinery of government to make certain that policies enhancing
his 'business profitability will be adopted, and even those who do may turn
against him once in office. In addition, support for a candidate or party neces-
sarily carries with it support for many policies and programs in which the
donor has no business interest whatever, and, to the extent that this is the
case, expenditures for such support are even more certainly not ordinary and
necessary.
Furthermore, at least when the business is incorporated, such expenditures
would contravene "sharply defined" governmental policies. In the case of fed-
eral elections, the Corrupt Practices Act prohibits all corporate campaign
donations, 77 and most states have enacted similar prohibitions applicable in
state elections. 78 Even when campaign support is sufficiently disguised to avoid
these prohibitions, the Treasury would nevertheless seem warranted in deny-
ing deductibility. The underlying policy of these legislative enactments seems
equally applicable whether the support takes the form of direct corporate con-
tributions to a campaign fund or one of the more subtle, and more practiced,
forms.7
9
74. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 337 (1941).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1959).
76. These expenses would seem to be ordinary in the sense of "normal, usual, or
customary" and "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved,"
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). See also Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S.
111 (1933). But they would not seem to be "payments by and with reasonable expectations
that the business of ... [taxpayer] would be advanced." Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C.
287, 295 (1951). These payments "clearly come within the class of contributions from
which only indefinite and indirect benefit may be expected .... ." Old Mission Portland
Cement Co. v. -Commissioner, 69 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1934). See also Emery, Bird, Thayer
Dry Goods Co., 20 B.T.A. 796 (1930) ; Hirsch-Weis Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 796 (1928).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 671; PA. STAT. Aim. tit. 25, §§ 3225(b), 3543 (Supp.
1958).
79. The federal prohibition on corporate campaign contributions has been largely in-
effective. Contributions once made directly by the corporation are now made by corporate
officials and their families, through various national business groups or through the pur-
chase of "public interest" advertisements. Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Fcderal
Election Finances: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 995 (1953).
Although state prohibitions may be broadly worded, they do not appear to have been ex-
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Legislative-Congress, State Legislature, or State Referendum
Textile Mills and Cammarano would seem conclusively to deny deductibility
to business expenses designed to ensure adoption or defeat of a legislative bill.
The regulations which the Court upheld in those cases contained terms iden-
tical to those of the recently promulgated regulations; expenditures for "lobby-
ing purposes" and for the "promotion or defeat of legislation" are not deduct-
ible.8 0 Giving the terms "lobbying" and "promotion or defeat of legislation"
their accepted meaning,8 ' it would seem, therefore, that any spending by busi-
ness designed to influence the outcome of a bill in Congress or a state legis-
lature is nondeductible. Furthermore, Cammarano appears dispositive of the
proposition that state referendums are "legislation" and subject to the regu-
lations equally with bills before a legislature.82 The new regulations adopt this
broad view in defining "promotion or defeat of legislation" to include "at-
tempting to... influence members of a legislative body ... or... influence
the public to approve or reject a measure in a referendum, initiative, vote on
a constitutional amendment, or similar procedure."83
Administrative or Executive
To date, it appears that the Treasury has not sought to disallow deductions
for expenditures designed to influence the decisions of administrative and ex-
ecutive bodies.8 4 Yet nothing in Caminarano indicates that the announced
policy is not equally applicable beyond the legislative stage, during the equally
crucial stage of interpretation, construction, and enforcement of legislative acts
or exercise of executive powers. Such an extension of Cammarano might be
viewed as particularly desirable in light of recent disclosures of business spend-
ing to influence regulatory commissions 85 and because a policy designed to
tensively invoked. See, e.g., PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 25, § 3225 (corporate contributions can
not be made "directly or through any other person") N.Y. PLx. LAW § 671 ("directly or
indirectly").
80. Compare Treas. Reg. 74, art. 262 (1929), and Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(o)-i (1943),
with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1959).
81. "Lobbying" certainly encompasses pressure activities in the presence of the enact-
ing body, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumley, 345
U.S. 41, 47 (1953), although it probably includes much more today, Zeller, The Federal
Regldation of Lobbying Act, 42 Ams. POL. Sci. Rnx. 239, 268 (1948) ; Celler, Pressure
Groups in Congress, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 1, at 3.
82. "We think that initiatives are plainly 'legislation' within the Regulations." Cam-
marano v. United States, 353 U.S. 498, 505 (1959).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (3) (1959).
84. Payments for the actual purchase of political influence to be exercised by or upon
an administrative agency have, however, been denied deductibility. See Harden Mortgage
Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F2d 282 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Estate of Joseph H. Scobell, 47
B.T.A. 971 (1942) (dictum) ; -text at note 96 infra.
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1959, p. 1, col. 2; March 27, 1960, p. 1,
col. 4; 104 CONG. R.. 1934, 1948 (1958); 105 CoNG. Rxc. 12381-84 (1959) (remarks of
Senator Dirksen). For an illustration of efforts to influence the executive branch, see S.
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achieve "tax equilibrium" between business and nonbusiness spending would
be relatively impotent if it were applicable only at the legislative stage.
Nevertheless, factors against such an extension of the Camniarano policy
exist. Perhaps only the legislative process is sufficiently susceptible to pressure
activities to warrant the inhibition on the dissemination of information im-
posed by nondeductibility. When amounts are expended in quasi-judicial hear-
ings, procedural safeguards may raise countervailing policies of the right to
counsel and a fair trial 86 and diminish the possibilities of undue business in-
fluence.87 Members of administrative and executive agencies are arguably "ex-
pert" in the field and have adequate staff assistance and thus are not subject
to outside pressures. And in the case of firms subject to ratemaking control
the ratemaking body may simply disallow such expenses in calculating rates:
indeed, it might be argued that insofar as such expenses are allowed in rate-
making they are tacitly approved and should not be further tampered with
by disallowing deductions.8s
Also, the Cammarano decision may not furnish the basis for a definition of
"lobbying" broad enough to encompass activities designed to influence ad-
ministrative and executive decisionmaking. Unlike the Treasury regulations
at issue in Camnimarano, the charitable-educational sections, from which the
Court argued by analogy, do not include the term "lobbying,"8' 0 and the regu-
lations under those sections are framed so as to exclude activities designed to
REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1957). See also Newman, The Supreme Court,
Congressiotul Investigatou, and Influence Peddling, 33 N.Y.U.L. REy. 796 (1958);
Note, 73 11ARV. L. REv. 1178 (1960).
86. These policies argue for the allowance of tax deductions at least to the extent that
expenditures are for counsel and for developing material necessary to a full hearing. See
Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAX L. REV. 241 (1957); ef. Waldo
Salt, 18 T.C. 182 (1952).
87. In its adjudicative capacity the administrative agency, although its procedures are
more relaxed, most nearly resembles a court. See generally Jackson, The Administrative Pro-
cess, 5 J. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143 (1940). Although pressure groups often resort to te
courts, Vose, Litigatiozn as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 20, no
one has successfully contended that expenditures for such activities should be nondeductible,
See Independent Brewing Co., 4 B.T.A. 870 (1926), acq., VI-1 CuMs. BULL. 3, 8 (1927) ;
George Ringler & Co., 10 B.T.A. 1134, 1136 (1928). These considerations suggest the
possibility of permitting deductibility of expenditures designed to influence administrative
proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature, even if Caunnarano were extended to other
forms of administrative and executive decision making. While such a distinction miay seem
plausible, it might be anticipated that the Treasury would have difficulty drawing such a
fine line.
88. In Alabama Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 209 (FPC 1959), the Federal Power Comin.
mission held that expenditures by private electric companies for advertising which stated
their poor competitive position with respect to publicly owned utilities were not chargeable,
for accounting purposes, against the rate payer but were to be borne by the shareholders. The
Treasury denied deduction to the same expenditures for income tax purposes. Special
Ruling, 6 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6352. Similarly the Commission, in 1957,
refused to allow the Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. to pass on legal fees paid after the utility
won a rate increase to its customers. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
89. ITNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c).
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influence administrative and executive decisionmaking. 0° At least insofar as
the decision rested upon a congressional policy reflected in the charitable-
educational section, therefore, it would not seem to warrant such an expan-
sive definition of "lobbying." Moreover, one accepted definition is that which
the Supreme Court adopted in two decisions 91 construing the Regulation of
Lobbying Act: representations and communications made directly to Congress
and its members concerning pending or proposed legislation. It is generally
assumed that that act does not apply at the administrative-executive stage,02
and the term would seem to carry a similarly limited meaning in most state
regulation-of-lobbying acts.93 Although the new regulations also forbid deduc-
tion of the expenses of "promotion or defeat of legislation" and state that this
term "shall not be limited -to the legislative stage,"0 4 and although this phrase
may thus be amenable to a construction wlhich would include the administra-
tive or executive stages, the phrase is supplementary to "lobbying" and may
not apply -to activity which could not first be termed lobbying. Finally, insofar
as the Cam marano decision rested upon reenactment arising from "consistent
construction," it could not be viewed as extending to activities directed at ad-
ministrative and executive bodies since the Treasury has never attempted to
apply its regulations in that context.05
But even if the broad policy of Cam niarano does not extend to the adminis-
trative and executive process, a longstanding line of cases would still deny
deductibility to sums expended for the purpose of purchasing influence to be
exercised upon administrative and executive agency personnel." These cases,
90. "The term legislation' ... includes action by the Congress, by any State legislature,
by any local council or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative,
constitutional amendment or similar procedure." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-I (1958).
The regulation only prohibits the deduction of expenditures for attempts to influence
"legislation."
91. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 (1953). The Caininarano Court suggested that "lobbying" as used in the regulations
might be similarly defined. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 505 n.8 (1959).
92. See Zeller, The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 42 Am. Poi- Sc. REv. 239
(1948) ; Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 FED. B.J. 366 (1949) ;
Comment, Improving the Legislative Process: Federal Regulation of Lobbying, 56 YALE
Lj. 304 (1947).
93. See Zeller, Regulation of Pressure Groups and Lobbyists, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 94.
A few state acts expressly include lobbying before executive agencies. S. Rzi,. No. 395, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1957).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (3) (1959).
95. On the contrary, an early ruling expressly accorded deductibility to such expenses.
G.C.f. 1627, VI-1 Cu. Bum. 59 (1927).
96. See, e.g., Harden 'Mortgage Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F2d 282 (10th Cir.
1943); Rugel v. Commissioner, 17 F2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942); Alexandria Gravel Co. v.
Commissioner, 95 F2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Aetna-Standard Engr Co., 15 T.C. 284 (1950).
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473-74 (1943), indicated approval of these
decisions.
Payments made directly to administrators or executives with the intent of influencing
their decision are prohibited by legislation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (1958). Their deductibility
would, of course, be denied under Heininger.
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the validity of which has not been seriously questioned, form a much less ex-
pansive exception to deductibility than Cammarano since they are specifically
limited to cases involving direct payments.9 7 Marking such expenditures for
special treatment appears justified by the fact that direct payments of this type
have no redeeming virtue; they serve no informational function and substitute
monetary incentives for the force of facts and ideas. Other especially oppro-
brious expenditures for influencing the administrative and executive process,
for example, sums spent pursuant to contingent-fee lobbying contracts, could
also be brought within this general public policy exception if they are outside
the reach of Canmnarano.9 8
Methods of Influence
Business expenditures for traditional methods of influence-contacting legis-
lators and officials personally-clearly fall within Camniarano. The term "lob-
bying," which has alvays appeared in the Treasury regulations, including
those considered in Caminmarano, normally conjures up the image of button-
holing.
Expenditures incurred in preparing data for and in appearing before legis-
lative or administrative bodies present a more difficult problem because of their
more apparent relationship to government's need for information. 9  When a
governmental 'body entertains testimony in accordance with established pro-
cedures, particularly when compulsory process is employed, it is at least argu-
able that a policy has been expressed in favor of the receipt of information
which overrides any policies against deductibility.0 0 Nevertheless, no excep-
tion to -the Cammarano rationale based upon the need of government ,for in-
formation has been judicially suggested.' 0' In ,fact, some of the expenditures
for which deduction was disallowed in Textile Mills were for testimony before
Congress.' 02 The Camnarano decision and the Treasury regulations, as a
97. In resting on broad public policy grounds rather than on a governmentally declared
policy, these decisions appear to be an exception to the rule announced in Lilly v. Coni.
missioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
98. See also Harden Mortgage Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir.
1943) (apparently reading Textile Mills narrowly as supporting this line of cases).
99. See Celler, Pressure Groups in Congress, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 1; H.R. REt'. No.
3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 23-28 (1950) ("The intelligence function of lobbying ... [assume,,]
special importance in an era of complex and wide-ranging legislation."); 13 CoNa. Q.
ALMAXAC 734 (1957) (76 members of Congress, 66% of those polled, state in answer to
a questionnaire that most lobbyists are helpful in providing detailed facts on complicated
legislative questions).
100. It has been asserted that these expenditures do not substantially differ from those
incurred to present arguments before courts. See Note, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1408 (1954) ; Note,
54 HARV. L. REv. 852 (1941). But see Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income
Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. REv. 365, 385 (1959).
101. Cf. Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1931) (suggesting distinction between
lobbying and appearances to persuade by presentation of facts).
102. Brief for Petitioner, p. 7, Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. United States, 314 U.S. 32(1
(1941).
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general proposition, ignore the potentially favorable impact on the political
process of more widespread dissemination of information stimulated by the
availability of tax deductions.
Business expenditures for political-legislative purposes have, however, been
perceptibly refocused in recent decades toward the public generally, or to
opinion-forming groups within the public, and away from the actual machinery
of government' 0 3 In recognition of this development, the regulations before
the Court in Camnnarano denied deductibility to expenses for "the exploitation
of propaganda, including advertising other than trade advertising." Of course,
since Cannzuarano involved statewide referendums in which the sole effective
means of influencing the outcome was advertising and publicity directed at the
electorate, it might be argued that expenditures for these purposes are non-
deductible only in connection with referendums or political campaigns. But it
is more likely that such expenditures are nondeductible even when the desired
result is the adoption of a bill in Congress or a state legislature. The new
Treasury regulations, therefore, explicitly purport to cover expenditures de-
signed to influence members of a legislative body "indirectly, by urging or
encouraging the public -to contact such members" and also "for carrying on
propaganda (including advertising) related to" lobbying or the promotion or
defeat of legislation. 04
Application of the policy of nondeductibility to these indirect methods of
influence raises one of the most difficult post-Cammarano problems: ascertain-
ing whether advertising and propaganda campaigns are sufficiently "related"
to a political objective to warrant nondeductibility. The "trade advertising"
exception in the Canmmraw regulations, reformulated in the new regulations
as "institutional or 'good will' advertising,"' 05 would seem to set forth the
principal grounds for denying this necessary connection. Expenses for cam-
paigns which name and promote products without any relationship to political
objectives are clearly deductible. But -this distinction between promotion of
products and of political ideas may in practice be troublesome. For example,
the Treasury ruled in 1958 that expenditures by private power companies for
publicity asserting their poor competitive position was compared with publicly
owned power facilities were nondeductible. 0 0 It was the view of the Treasury
that the campaign which called for remedial action was in fact designed to
affect legislation before Congress. But this ruling is of questionable vitality
under the new 1959 regulations which go beyond a "trade advertising" ex-
103. See Celler, mtpra note 99, at 268; Turner, How Pressure Groups Operatc, Annals,
Sept. 1958, p. 63, at 68; Note, 11 OHio ST. L.J. 557 (1950); Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 304,
306-07 (1947) ; H.R. RP,. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 29 (1950) ("Today, the long-
run objective of every significant pressure group in the country is and must inevitably be
the creation and control of public opinion .....
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1959).
105. Ibid.
106. Special Ruling, 6 CCH 1958 STAND. Fa'. T.Ax REP. ff 6352; see Note, 46 VA. L
REv. 112, 120-21 (1960).
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ception by stating that deductibility will be allowed for "advertising which
presents views on economic, financial, social, or other subjects of a general
nature.'
07
Assuming that this new regulation constitutes a permissible interpretation
of Caminmarano, which considered only the "trade advertising" phraseology,
the problems which will arise in its administration will be far reaching. A clear
distinction between advertising of a "general nature" and that designed to
achieve a political-legislative objective would appear impossible to draw with
specificity. For example, a 1945 Tax Court decision allowed deductions, over
Treasury objections, for a public information program entitled "reselling the
American Way to America" carried on by an organization sponsored by the
National Association of Manufacturers. 08 The program provided for the dis-
semination of information concerning the free enterprise system by radio,
motion picture, -booklet, outdoor advertising, newspapers, and speakers. Rely-
ing upon cases involving World War I expenditures by the Association of
Railway Executives for similar purposes,' the Tax Court reasoned that the
purpose of the NAM program was to correct unsympathetic public opinion and
not, as the Treasury contended, to influence the political process." 0 No reliable
or definite criteria seem to point the way to a decision in cases of this sort.
Ostensibly innocuous publicity may in fact be related to unnamed legislation,
political parties, or candidates and may create a climate in which the defeat
or adoption of a legislative bill or the success or failure of a candidate or party
is much affected."' Whether this type of expenditure, which may well account
for the bulk of politically-related business activity, is to be disallowed in in-
dividual cases will necessarily depend upon how far the Treasury and the
courts wish to carry the Canmnarano rationale. That rationale could be limited
drastically by placing most questionable propaganda in the category of "good
will advertising" or social and economic publicity of a "general nature."
The regulations seem properly to envision a test of purpose rather than
effect in denying deductibility. Thus, if the propaganda is designed to influence
the political process, even if its impact is either speculative or clearly negative
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1) (1959).
108. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 147 (1945). The Coln-
missioner had disallowed the deductions on the grounds that the payments constituted
contributions to a charitable-educational organization which was engaging in a substantial
amount of legislative activity.
109. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 72 Ct. C1. 629,52 F.2d 1040 (1931) ; Kansas City
So. Ry., 22 B.T.A. 949, 963 (1931) ; Norfolk So. R.R., 22 B.T.A. 302 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 63 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1933); Missouri Pac. R.R., 22 B.T.A. 267 (1931); Io
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 18 B.T.A. 168 (1929).
110. 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 180-81.
111. See H.R. R p. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Bicks & Friedman, Regil a-
tion of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 995
n.97 (1953) ; Hearings Before the Hduse Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 146-48 (1950). News releases may also be used, see id. at 71, 95,
and access to editorial columns may be sought, see H.R. REP. No. 3138, op. cit. supra at 37.
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to the taxpayer's objective, expenditures for it would be disallowed. For ex-
ample, if no bill is actually pending during the taxable year for which deduc-
tion is claimed, it might be argued that the Cammarano rule of nondeducti-
bility is inapplicable because the expenditure is not "related to" the promotion
or defeat of legislation. But such a mechanical distinction would not be proper.
Massive lobbying may be mounted long before the bill in question is actually
introduced, and one objective of the campaign may be to prevent introduction
from talcing place. Cammarano would not seem to require that the citadel be
successfully stormed before expenditures for getting there become disallow-
able. On the other hand, purpose should not be taken to require a finding of
subjective intent, which should be viewed as irrelevant. So long as the propa-
ganda seems reasonably related to a political-legislative objective, as measured
by all the circumstances including the wording of the media selected, it should
fall within the rule of Camnarano.
Organizational Structure of the Inlucncing Agency
Ad Hoc Multienterprise Activities
Of the organizational structures which businesses may adopt through which
to channel expenditures for the influencing of governmental policy, perhaps
the most obvious is that employed in Canimarano and Stratuss. In those cases,
a number of independent enterprises sharing the same legislative objective set
up an ad hoc body with the limited purpose of seeking that objective."- By
thus concerting their activities, businesses may eliminate duplication and con-
flict, hire a specialized staff--or, as in Textile Mills, enter into a contract with
an outside lobbying or public relations firm-and, in general, obtain more
efficient results for their lobbying dollars.' 3 They may also be able to obtain
considerable anonymity behind the front of the ad hoc body, which may suc-
cessfully display a public facade of financial disinterest and nonpartisanship. 1 4
112. Although the decisions are by no means clear, it appears that contributions to ad
hoc organizations were, prior to Cammarano, denied deductibility in a few instances. See,
e.g., Old Misson Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1934) ; The
Mosby Hotel Co., 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 920 (1954); H. R. Cullen, 41 B.T.A. 1054
(1940) ; The Adler Co., 10 B.T.A. 849 (1928).
113. A recent illustration of such concerted activity is the natural gas industry's forma-
tion of the General Gas Committee subsequent to Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672 (1954), which held that natural gas production was subject to regulation
by the Federal Power Commission. The committee was formed for the sole purpose oi
securing legislation to exempt the production of natural gas from such regulation. Contri-
butions to it, some of which were deducted as business expenses, totalled $118,623. The
effort was important in the passage of the Harriss-Fulbright Bill which, however, was
vetoed by the President. S. ReP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957). The Natural
Gas Bureau Bill, H.R_ 6645, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957), was also vetoed. 102 CONG. Rrc.
14651 (1956). The industry's efforts in connection with this bill were investigated fully.
S. REP. No. 1724, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
114. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 311-13 (1947) (outlining the methods adopted
by public utility companies in their campaign against government regulation or ownership),
S. RnP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-33 (1957).
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Furthermore, the limited objectives of such groups, on which widespread
agreement is possible, enable a maximum number of enterprises to contribute,
perhaps resulting in participation transcending the normal lines of industry
cooperation. And by limiting the existence of the structure to the period dur-
ing which the desired measure is pending,115 the necessity of accumulating
funds can be avoided and any excess of income over expenditures can be re-
turned to contributors. Hence, no necessity for paying an income tax or for
seeking an exemption will normally arise."(
But this device would be obviously susceptible to Cammarano. So long as
the activities of the body are "related to" a political-legislative goal, contribu-
tions to them will be wholly nondeductible. Since their objectives will normal-
ly be unambiguous, identification of the contributions to ad hoc groups as
nondeductible will be relatively easy, and the administration of the Cammarano
rule will raise a minimum of difficulties.
In addition, by extending the Cammarano rationale a 'bit further, the Treas-
ury could seek to make all the ad hoc body's expenditures nondeductible and
require it to report all contributions as income." 7 Although no attempt was
apparently made to disallow expenditures of the groups in Cammarano and
Strauss, Teatile Mills, broadly read, would seem authority for denying de-
ductibility to their expenditures and taxing their income.118 Indeed, carried to
its logical extreme, the Cammarano policy could lead to a long chain of non-
deductibility. Suppose that a Camnmarano-type ad hoc body hired a public
relations firm which in turn hired a lobbying firm which retained a lawyer.
The Treasury might attempt to deny deductions not only to the contributions
of ,the enterprises to the ad hoc body but also to the expenditures of that body
for the public relations firm, to the expenditures of the public relations firm
for the lobbying firm, to the expenditures of the lobbying firm for the lawyer,
and to the expenses of the lawyer." 9
In all probability, however, few would argue for nondeductibility of such
expenses, at least when the initial contributions to the ad hoc body have at-
115. Lenhart & Schriftgiesser, Management in Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 32, at 37.
116. Although these organizations might appear to be encompassed by Ir. R V. Coot;
oF 1954, § 501 (c) (6) and thus to be entitled to tax exemption as business leagues, see the
definition in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (6)-1, they are not accorded such status, see Rev.
Rul. 54-442, 1954-2 Cum. BUL. 131. Arkansas Legal Control Associates Inc., contributions
to which were involved in Strauss, applied for such an exception and was rejected. Brief for
Respondents, p. 7 n.3, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
117. The expenditures of the Camniarano trust fund were for the promotion of legisla-
tion just as much as were the contributions to it. Record, pp. 103-07, Cammarano v. United
States.
118. Textile Mills involved the expenditures of a third-party organization which, if the
contingent fee arrangement is disregarded, is distinguishable from the Camnarano ad hoc
body only because of its profit motive. See Joseph Schoenbaum, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Men.
615 (1957) (expenses of lawyer retained, not on contingent fee basis, to examine possibility
of obtaining state legislation to legalize racing).
119. Cf. Spofford, The Impact of Some Recent Developments in Tax Litigation and
Legislation, 37 TAXES 1068, 1070 (1959).
1036 [Vol. 69:1017
CAMMARANO v. UNITED STATES
ready been disallowed on the returns of the contributing enterprises. This con-
clusion appears to follow from a decision handed down shortly before Cam-
marano. In Commissioner v. Sullivan '" the Court answered in the affirma-
tive the question of "whether amounts expended to lease premises and hire
employees for the conduct of alleged illegal gambling enterprises ... [were]
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses ... .,,m If expenses
of an illegal organization are deductible, it would seem that the legal and pre-
sumably less objectionable expenses of lobbying organizations would be also.
The Sullivan Court did carve out an exception to its general rule, stating that
expenses for "certain condemned activities" are still nondeductible. Although
it cited Textile Mills as an example of this exception,' - that citation presum-
ably refers to the contingent-fee contract there involved, ' and the exception
to Sudlivan would not seem to e-x-tend to other forms of political-legislative
activities. Furthermore, a denial of deductibility to the expenditures of such
ad hoc bodies would go far beyond the view expressed in Sullivan that the
gross receipts of a business should not be taxed unless Congress specifically
states that it is to be doneL4 and would involve the Treasury in endless en-
forcement problems.
Exempt Charitable-Educational Organizations
In addition to employing ad hoc Cammarano-type organizations, business-
men, either in concert with others or alone, may seek to effectuate the legis-
lative aims of their businesses through charitable-educational organizations
accorded exempt status under section 501(c)3.15 This status carries with it
the privileges of making "reasonable" accumulations in the organization free
from tax liability 'G and -from obligation to file income tax returns.127 And
under section 170(b) contributions to such organizations may be deducted by
individual businessmen in an amount not exceeding twenty per cent of their
gross income and by corporations in an amount not exceeding five per cent
120. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 28.
123. Only the contingent-fee arrangement was in any way "condemned" by the Textile
Mills Court. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 338 (1941) ("con-
tracts to spread such insidious influences through legislative halls have long been con-
demned"). Certainly lobbying in general is not "condemned." See Celler, Pressure Groups
in Congress, Annals, Sept. 1938, p.1 .
124. 356 U.S. at 28.
125. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (c) (3) (encompassing corporations, funds, founda-
tions and community chests). For a discussion of the Internal Revenue Service's admin-
istration of -this section see Hearings on HR. Res. 561 Before the House Select Commlittee
To Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Cdm parable Organizations, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 56 (1953) (testimony of Norman A. Sugarman, then Assistant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue).
126. IxT. RErv. CODE OF 1954, § 504.
127. These organizations must, however, file annual informational returns. IN.T. Rsv.
CoDE oF 1954, § 6033.
1960o] 1037
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of their gross income.128 In addition to furnishing a possibility of disguising
"business expenses" nondeductible under Cannnarano as deductible "charitable
contributions," the charitable-educational organization may offer a greater
aura of respectability and may afford greater anonymity than alternative out-
lets for political-legislative expenditures. The official grant of exemption may
operate as a stamp of legitimacy and avoid questions as to sponsorship and
charges of partisanship which might diminish the effectiveness of Cammarano-
type organizations.
But 501 (c) 3 and the applicable regulations seek to impose rigid restrictions
on the pursuit of political objectives by charitable-educational organizations.
A claim for 501(c)3 exemption must meet two statutory tests. First, the or-
ganization must be "organized and operated exclusively" for "charitable ...
or educational purposes" and, second, "no substantial part" of its activities in
pursuing this exclusive purpose may consist of "carrying on propaganda or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation" or supporting or opposing can-
didates in "any political campaign."'1 29
Within the 'broad confines of the term "educational," business-supported
organizations may be able through widespread dissemination of publications
and use of other mass media to create a more favorable climate of public
opinion for specific legislative or political objectives.8 0 An example is the
Foundation for Economic Education, sustained by large corporate contribu-
128. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b).
129. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 501 (c)3. These restrictions on the activities of charitable-
educational organizations have been extensively discussed. See Latcham, Private Charilt-
able Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications, 98 U. PA. L. Rv. 617 (1950);
Note, 57 COLUm. L. Rzv. 271 (1957); Note, 37 VA. L. REv. 988 (1951); Note, 1956
Wis. L. REv. 165. The idea that these organizations have a duty to participate in contro.
versial areas which might be labeled "political," a duty which can not be fulfilled under
the present tax laws, has also been expressed. See Embree, Timid Billions: Are the
Foundations Doing Their Jobsf, Harper's, March 1949, p. 28; Devine, Pioneers or Propa-
gandists, 29 SURVEY GRAPHic 348 (1940).
This restriction was orginally formulated by the courts, 6ee Slee v. Commissioner, 42
F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930); Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931), and was
initially enacted into the Revenue Act of 1934, § 101 (6). The legislative history is meager.
78 CONG. REc. 5861, 5959, 7831 (1934). It has been suggested that this statutory proscription
adds nothing to the common law. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Orqani-
zation?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525 (1958) ; see ln re Murphy's Estate, 7 Cal. 2d 712, 62 P.2d 374
(1936); Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 Pac. 526 (1928); Bowditch v. Attorney
General, 241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922). See generally Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 988
(1951).
130. It is obviously difficult to distinguish between education and propaganda for a
proscribed purpose. See Sugarman, Current Issues on the Use of Tax-Exempt Organiza-
lions, 34 TAXES 795 (1956); Young & Galvin, Proposed Regulations Do Not Clarify Tax
Status of "Exempt Organizations," 5 J. TAxAT oN 298 (1956); Note, 42 A.B.A.J. 773
(1956). See also Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931); Cochran v. Com-
missioner, 78 F.2d 176 (4th Or. 1935) ; Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th
Cir. 1955) ; Hearings Before the Special Commnnittee To Investigate Tax-Exempt Founda-
tions and Comparable Organizations, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 429 (1954).
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tions,731 which obtained 501(c) 3 status 132 for its program of educating the
public in the disadvantages of governmental intervention in the economy.
Under the 1959 regulations, such organizations do not lose the "exclusively
educational" character even if their pronouncements advocate "a particular posi-
tion or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair ex-position
of the pertinent {acts as to permit an individual or the public to form an in-
dependent opinion or conclusion. ' 1 33 The meaning of the latter limitation is
perhaps illustrated by denial of exempt status to the Committee for Constitu-
tional Government 13 4 which appears distinguishable from the Foundation for
Economic Education only in the greater militancy of its views.135
One limitation on the availability of this device is implied by the term
"educational" itself: activity immediately identifiable as advocacy of the pros
or cons of legislation or political candidates -will be viewed as not "exclusively
educational." 136 For example, exemption as an educational organization was
denied the Natural Gas and Oil Resources Committee,137 and deduction of
some two million dollars in contributions to the committee by firms in the
natural gas industry was therefore disallowed.1 38 The committee's stated pur-
pose was to educate the public on the "benefits of an unregulated industry"
and to engage solely in conducting an information and education program,130
but its apparent connection with industry attempts to promote the Harniss-
Fulbright Bill probably accounted for denial of 501(c) 3 exemption. In general,
however, the outer boundaries of "exclusively educational" remain necessarily
obscure and dependent upon a case-by-case evaluation.140 Indeed, the regula-
tions, which set forth such criteria as whether the organization's activities are
131. Large contributors include E. I. duPont de Nemours, Cu-ysler Corp., Gulf
Oil Co., Marshall Field & Co., and Montgomery Ward Co. Hearings Before the House
Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 14-20 (1950).
132. Tax exemption was granted on April 2, 1947. H.R. RE'. No. 3138, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1950).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l(d) (3) (1958).
134. Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Lobbying Actitiles, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 39.40 (1950).
135. The only difference between the two organizations appears to be that the founda-
tion's "literature contains little of the specific exhortation to action which is so much a part
of the publications distributed by the Committee. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 33 (1950).
136. Cf. Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931).
137. S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1957).
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 11.
140. The courts have regarded the charitable exemptions as liberalizations in favor
of the taxpayer which are not to be narrowly construed. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144
(1934). The Treasury's initial attempts restrictively to define the term "educational"
therefore met with little success, and this liberal approach requires the dra ng of fine
lines on the basis of all the facts presented. Hearings Before the Speeial Conmittee To
Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organications, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 428-34 (1954).
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"beneficial to the community,"'141 would seem to invite subjective evaluation
on the basis of the predilections of the Treasury and courts.'
42
Organizations which meet this "exclusively educational" test may devote an
insubstantial portion of their resources to political activities and still satisfy
501 (c) 3s second test. But unless such activities are reasonably ancillary to
the organization's exempt purpose, that purpose will lose its "exclusive" char-
acter and exemption should 'be denied. 143 Thus, for example, if several cor-
porations set up a charitable foundation -to provide scholarships for the chil-
dren of employees, an attempt to influence natural gas legislation would not
be reasonably ancillary to the organization's purpose and would result in loss
of 501 (c) 3 exemption, even if such attempt formed only an insubstantial
portion of the organization's activities. 4 4 On the other hand, the Foundation
for Economic Education might, as an insubstantial portion of its overall pro-
gram, attempt to influence natural gas legislation since such attempts would
not seem to run counter -to its exclusive purpose. Nonetheless, such organiza-
tions must be wary lest even an insubstantial program of actively influencing
legislation 'be taken to negate their "educational" purpose; such a program is
in danger of coloring the activities of the entire organization and may well ,be
'held sufficient evidence that the organization's dominant purpose is political.
Businessmen may also be able to make deductible contributions 'for political
purposes to existing 501 (c) 3 organizations which happen to share with them
a common political objective. For example, the Daughters of the American
Revolution is an exempt 501 (c) 3 organization 145 whose political-legislative
activities have been deemed to be insubstantial. Thus, within the limits of in-
substantiality, the Daughters may attempt to influence the outcome of partic-
ular legislation, and 'businessmen whose businesses would be benefited by the
Daughters' view on this legislation could make deductible contributions to the
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959).
142. The statute "provides much leeway for varied opinions in a field in which persons
are likely to have strong personal views." Hearings, supra note 140, at 431. Subjective
evaluation seems to have been the rule in the past. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Coni-
missioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (1).
Mass. 1938).
143. See Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930); Martha Hubbard Davis,
22 T.C. 1091 (1954); Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949). The substantiality
standard of the second test has on occasion seemingly been confused with the exclusivity
standard of the first. See Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360 (Ist Cir. 1937):
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
144. On the same basis, a corporate foundation formed to funnel corporate fund .
to other 501 (c)3 organizations which made minor contributions to a nonexempt pressure
group might have its exempt status challenged. Such nonoperating foundations tre
undoubtedly common due to the tax advantages which inhere in them. See 3 CCH 1960
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1111 3033.023-.0249.
145. I.T. 2334, VI-I Cum. BuL. 82 (1927). See also Genevieve Tucker, 2 B.T.A. 796
(1925).
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Daughters which could then expend some of the contributions for political-
legislative activities.
A difficult problem raised by these various possibilities is the interpretation
of substantiality. This test was first introduced in 1934 140 and, instead of
clarifying the statute, has led to considerable conflict in the decisions "17 and
has not diminished the apparent reliance of the Treasury and the courts on
shifting criteria which seem primarily to reflect agreement or disagreement
with the goals of the activity in question.148 And the new regulations issued
by the Treasury in 1959, which set forth more detailed interpretations of sub-
stantiality, 49 do not seem to offer much hope for more definite standards.15°
The regulations would deny exemption, without further inquiry, to organiza-
tions whose articles "expressly empower" them to carry on political activities
as defined in 501 (c) 3 otherwise than insubstantially. l r0 But this provision is
readily avoided by a method expressly authorized in the regulations: inserting
in the organizational papers a statement, phrased in the terms of the statute,
that no substantial part of the organization's activities can be political as
defined in 501(c) 3.152 The regulations also provide that an "action organiza-
tion" will not satisfy the substantiality test. An organization will be deemed
to fall within this class if its primary objective may be attained only through
legislative change which the organization campaigns for, or advocates, or if a
substantial part of its activities consist either of contacting or urging the public
to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of promoting legis-
lative change or advocating the adoption or rejection of legislation or of sup-
porting or opposing candidates in any political campaign. 53 But this "action
organization" definition seems to add little if anything to the terms of the
statute as interpreted by prior regulations and case law.5 4 And neither the
146. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(6), 48 Stat 700. The Treasury had pre-
viously promulgated similar standards in a regulation issued under the 1926 act. Treas.
Reg. 80 (1934). The legislative history with respect to this addition is meager, but it
appears that Congress' desire was to deny deductibility to selfishly motivated contributions.
78 CONG. Run. 5861, 5959, 7831 (1934).
147. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying
Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Rzv. 365, 387 nn.131 & 132 (1959).
148. See League of Women Voters v. Commissioner, No. 232-56, Ct Cl., January 20,
1960; Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ken.
1954) ; Henriette T. Noyes, 31 B.T.A. 121 (1934) (all involving the League of Women
Voters). See generally Hearings, supra note 140, at 429-34.
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1, adopted June 26, 1959, by T.D. 6391.
150. But see Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for
Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. RE%. 363, 389 (1959) ("the new regulations should be
more of an aid in construing the statutory provision").
151. This is the so-called "organizational test" which also provides that the purposes
must be limited to one or more exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (b) (1959).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.505 (c) (3)-l (b) (ii) (1959).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (1959).
154. See Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1945) (recipient could
effectively accomplish its aims only through legislative change); Leubuscher v. Corn-
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regulations nor the case law seem to afford any answer to the crucial question
of whether substantiality turns upon absolute dollar amounts expended or
upon the percentage of total expenditures or both.l 5
Assuming that the substantiality test is met, all contributions to the exempt
organization will be deductible. Although the broad language of Cantmarano
might seem to require that such contributions be denied deductibility in pro-
portion to the organization's political activity, such an application of the
Camnuarano policy would appear impossible without an amendment to the
Code. Contributions to 501 (c) 3 organizations are governed by the all-or-
nothing provisions of section 170(c), not by section 162(b), the unique terms
of which-"ordinary and necessary"-are viewed by the Treasury as sufficient-
ly ambiguous to warrant partial denial of deductibility of contributions ,to
business leagues. 156 Furthermore, partial denial of deductibility to contribu-
tions to 501 (c) 3 organizations would likely force such organizations to aban-
don even their insubstantial political activities, and, therefore, indirectly repeal
501 (c) 3s sanction to such activities. On the other hand, a recent revenue rul-
ing may offer an alternative means in some instances of achieving a near-
equivalent implementation of the Cammarano policy. By a rigid application of
the substantiality test, the Treasury could deny 501 (c) 3 exemptions. Under
the revenue ruling, organizations denied exemption for this reason may be
subsequently granted such exemption by splitting off their political activities
and placing them in a separate subsidiary.1 7 Contributions to the subsidiary
would thus ,be nondeductible and contributions to the exempt parent deduct-
ible, the same result as if the original organization had been granted exemption
and contributions denied deductibility in proportion to its political-legislative
activities.
It might also be argued that a logical extension of Cammarano and Te.xtilc
Mills requires that 501(c) 3 organizations be taxed-the equivalent of deny-
ing deductibility to their expenses--on sums, even though insubstantial, ex-
pended for political-legislative activity. But this argument flies directly in the
face of 501 (c) 3s total exemption of organizations which meet its two tests,
Only a very broad reading of Camnimarano would warrant such a result and,
since the "sharply defined" policy of which the Camnarano Court speaks was
based in part upon analogy to 501 (c)3, it would seem impossible for Cant-
marano to override express language of that section. Furthermore, since con-
missioner, 54 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1932) (the purpose of the recipient was to effect legislative
change through advocacy); James J. Forstall, 29 B.T.A. 428 (1933) (purpose of re-
cipient was to effect change in governmental methods of dealing with international
questions).
155. See Sharp, supra note 150, at 386-90.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (2) (1959). Proportionate disallowance was initiated
in 1954. Rev. Rul. 54-442, 1954-2 Cum. Bum.. 131.
157. Rev. Rul. 54-243, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 92. The Committee for Constitutional Gov-
ernment, which was denied a tax-exemption, see note 134 supra, formed America's Future
Inc. as a subsidiary, operated from the same address, which was accorded tax-exempt
status. H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1950).
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tributions to 501(c) 3 organizations might be properly characterized as "gifts,"
taxing them even in part to the organization would appear inappropriate in
light of the Code's exclusion of gifts from the gross income of the recipient.1'
In sum, although charitable-educational organizations may offer some ad-
vantages to business spending in the political arena not afforded by alternative
structures, 501 (c) 3 provides a relatively restrictive framework within which
to operate in the political arena. While a vigorous interpretation of that section
against businessmen using such organizations to promote the political-legisla-
tive ends of their businesses might seem justified, such an interpretation must
also take into account others who would be affected. Since exempt charitable-
educational organizations afford the sole deductible means by which compar-
able nonbusiness activities may be carried on, a more relaxed interpretation
of 501 (c)3 may therefore ,be preferable. 159
Exempt Business Leagues
The organizations most actively engaged in expressing business' views on
political issues and in seeking to effectuate their legislative aims are longstand-
ing ,business leagues 160 which are generally speaking one of tvo types. The
first is the "trade association," composed of firms in the same industry, which
concerns itself -with the industry's problems, conducting research, gathering
statistics and disseminating the results through conferences, conventions, and
printed material.' 61 It also formulates or helps to formulate industrywide
political-legislative policies which it communicates to legislators and the public,
thereby providing "one of the major means by which business management
gets its policies across to government."' 02 A primary example of this type of
organization is the National Association of Real Estate Boards, which repre-
sents 60,000 realtors; in filing under the Regulation of Lobbying Act, this
158. Ixr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102.
159. Some would argue that the restrictions even as loosely interpreted hinder the
desirable activities of charitiable-educational organizations far too much. See Devine,
Pioneers or Propagandists?, 29 SuRvEY GRA2HIc 348 (1940).
160. BL.AiSDLZ, A~mucax DmxocnAcy UNDER PREssuRE 62 (1957); Lenhart &
Schriftgiesser, Management in Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 32; Comment, 56 YAmx
LJ. 304, 322 (1947). See also H.R. REP. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1951). See
the list of organizations reporting the largest amount spent under the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act in 1958, 15 CONG. Q. ALIMAiNAc 678 (1959), in 1957, 14 CoNG. Q. AL.Ac
627 (1958).
161. See I TRADE REG. Rm. 1 2017 (1954); Lenhart & Schriftgiesser, Management in
Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 32, at 36.
162. Id. at 37. For examples of politically active trade associations and their methods.
see S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-36 (1957). For the specified legislative aims
of some of these organizations in 1960, see 15 CONG. Q. ALmA.XNAc 677 (1959) (Transporta-
tion Associations). Contributions to these organizations are not affected by the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act and their activities may well benefit candidates. Bicks & Friedman,
Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L r -.
975,995 (1953).
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organization acknowledged spending 65,301 dollars in 1958 for direct lobby-
ing before Congress.163 The second type of business league has membership
transcending any particular industry lines and concerns itself with the broader
areas in which business -has an interest. 164 Such organizations engage in re-
search in these areas and present views on broad problems to the public and
to various legislatures. Perhaps the best examples of this class are the National
Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce.10 5
In 1950 the former reported that it expended 84,710 dollars for direct lobby-
ing before Congress and 2,000,000 dollars for the education of the public.1 00
Section 501 (c)6 of the Internal Revenue Code, in conjunction with section
501(a), accords tax-exempt status, permitting tax-free accumulations and
freedom from the filing of income tax returns, to:
Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards or boards of
trade not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 0 7
In contrast to section 501 (c) 3, this section imposes no restrictions on the
political-legislative activities of organizations comprehended within its exemp-
tion. Moreover, the deductibility of any payments made by 'business to exempt
business leagues is controlled only 'by the "ordinary and necessary" wording
of section 162, which imposes no limits on the percentage of an individual or
corporate taxpayer's gross income which the taxpayer may deduct as con-
tributions to such organizations, if "ordinary and necessary."' 08 Under its new
regulations, however, the Treasury has viewed Canimarano as rendering con-
tributions to 501 (c)6 organizations which engage in a substantial amount of
legislative activity nondeductible, except to the extent that the taxpayer "clear.
163. 15 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 680 (1959). This body is one of the best organized for
legislative activity. H.RL REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1950). For examples
of one lobbying method utilized by this and other trade associations, see id. at 37-40 (in-
stances of so-called editorial advertising). The amounts which these organizations acktuowl-
edged spending for "lobbying" during 1957 and 1958 may be found in 14 CONG. Q. AL.IANAC
627 (1958) and 15 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 678 (1959).
164. Lenhart & Schriftgiesser, supra note 162, at 37. See also Smith-Bridgman & Co.,
16 T.C. 287 (1951); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 4 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 147, 181-82
(1945).
165. Lenhart & Schriftgiesser, supra note 165, at 37; Blaisdell, supra note 161, at 62;
see S. REP. No. 395, op. cit. supra note 163, at 42. For their legislative achievements in 1959
and their goals for 1960 see 15 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 674 (1959).
166. H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6.
Considerations outlined in this section as applying to business leagues and trade asso-
ciations are also applicable to labor and farm organizations, which are similarly exempt
from taxation, similarly active politically, and contributions to which are similarly deductible
only as business expenses. See note 26 supra.
167. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)6.
168. See, e.g., Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951); Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry
Goods Co., 20 B.T.A. 796 (1930); Hirsch-Weis Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 796 (1928). The
amount deductible as a charitable contribution is limited to a percentage of gross income.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b).
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ly" shows that such contributions are not expended for legislative activity1co
For purposes of discussion, it will 'be helpful to test these regulations first as
applied to special assessments and contributions for political-legislative activi-
ties and, second, as applied to regular dues payments.
Although prior to Textile Mi& the Treasury was unsuccessful in denying
deduction to special assessments and contributions,'"0 the lower courts have
upheld its denials since that case.' 17 And the expenditures involved in Cam-
marano itself were, practically speaking, payments made to a tax-exempt trade
association specifically for legislative activity.17 2 With respect to these pay-
ments, therefore, construction has been consistent in -favor of denial, and Cam-
marano would require nondeductibility. Thus, the new regulations properly
conclude that "in no event shall special assessments or similar payments (in-
cluding an increase in dues) made to any organization for any" legislative-
political purpose be deductible.'7 3
With respect to regular dues payments, the regulations' rule of disallow-
ance is of dubious validity. The "consistent construction" which partially justi-
fled use of the reenactment doctrine in Cammarano is to the contrary with
respect to such contributions. Apparently, they have been disallowed only
once 174 when the "ordinary and necessary" criteria were otherwise satisfied. 7 5
169. Dues and other payments to an organization, such as a labor union or a trade
association, which otherwise meet the requirements of the regulations under section
162, are deductible in full unless a substantial part of the organization's activities
consists of one or more... [proscribed legislative activity]. If a substantial part
of the activities of the organization consists of one or more of those so specified.
deduction will be allowed only for such portion of such dues and other payment..
as the taxpayer can clearly establish is attributable to activities other than thu-se
so specified.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c)(2) (1959).
170. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 72 Ct. CL 629, 52 F2d 1040 (1931);
Best Brewery Co., 16 B.T.A. 1354 (1929); George Ringler & Co., 10 B.T.A. 1134 (1928).
171. See, e.g., Mosby Hotel Co., 23 P-H Tax Ct Mer. 920 (1954); McClintock-
Trunkey Co., 19 T.C. 297 (1952). But the courts have disagreed with the Commissioner
on whether the particular payments were for proscribed purposes. Smith-Bridgman Co., 16
T.C. 287 (1951) ; Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 147, 181 (1945).
172. In Cammarano the contributions were paid to a trust fund formed by the Wash-
ington Beer Wholesalers Ass'n, 358 U.S. at 500 (1959), which was a tax-exempt
trade association, Record, p. 22, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (2) (1959).
174. McClintock-Trunkey Co., 19 T.C. 297 (1952).
175. Although the decisions do not expressly distinguish between assessments and
ordinary dues, because all litigated contributions were, according to the decision%, made
for a specific purpose, it is probable that they were special assessments. See case cited note
172 supra. But see Spiegel, Deductibility of Lobbying, Iniliat',, and Referendum Ez-
penses: A Problem for Congressidnal Consideration, 45 CALIF. L. R v. 1, 19 (1957) (due .
have been denied deduction "where the association was operated 'primarily' for legislative
purposes."). See also Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductiors
for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Rtv. 365, 382 (1959).
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Furthermore, the apparent congressional decision not to condition the tax-
exempt status of business leagues on the amount of their political-legislative
activities precludes the discovery of a "sharply defined" policy requiring dis-
allowance by analogy to section 501(c)3. Moreover, to the extent that this
omission indicates congressional approval of the normal lobbying activities of
business leagues, disallowance would undercut that approval by impairing re-
ceipt of dues for such activities. 176 To the extent that disallowance would
cause the organization to reduce or eliminate its regular political-legislative
activities, the regulation would introduce a limitation into the tax laws which
Congress omitted. Cammarano should not 'be read to go that far.177
By providing, for no expressed reason, for nondeductibility only if the or-
ganization's political-legislative activities are "substantial," 178 the Treasury
has extended the section 501 (c) 3 practice of requiring a preliminary applica-
tion of a substantiality test to section 501 (c) 6 organizations. Presumably, the
test of substantiality is the same and, therefore, as discussed above, fraught
with difficult problems. 179 Once the substantiality test is met by a section
501(c)6 organization, the regulations contemplate total disallowance unless
the taxpayer clearly shows that a portion of his payments are not attributable
to legislative activities of the organization. The practical effect of this require-
ment may often 'be total disallowance.180 But the courts may elect to override
the regulations. Since some portion of most dues payments to legitimate trade
associations undoubtedly constitute an allowable deduction which is refused
only because of a failure of proof by the taxpayer, the courts may apply the
rule of Couan v. Commissioner 18 and require approximation of the amount
of the taxpayer's allowable deduction.182 This approach would necessarily com-
176. Business leagues have been particularly outspoken in their criticism of this regu-
lation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1959, p. 83, col. 3; id., Sept. 30, 1959, p. 54, col. 3;
15 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 682 (1959). See also Washingto n Tax Talk, 37 TAxES 1036
(1959).
177. But see Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for
Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.L. Rxv. 365, 383 (1959) ; The StPreme Court, 1958 Term,
73 HA'v. L. REv. 84, 193 (1959) ("the absolute political equality which the Court found
to be within the legislative purpose can only be achieved by a blanket denial of the de-
duction").
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (2) (1959). Presumably the approach adopted is
premised upon an intent to treat § 501 (c)6 and § 501 (c)3 organizations similarly with
respect to their legislative activities. But Cammarano might be read to hold that all
business expenses for legislative activity are not "ordinary and necessary," and the
Treasury might have ruled that all amounts paid to support the legislative activities of
trade associations, irrespective of the extent of those activities, would be nondeductible.
179. See text at notes 146-55 supra.
180. This, of course, assumes that some effect will be given to the phrase "Clearly
shows." Taxpayer inability to meet this burden is probable. See Thomas J. Barkett, 31
T.C. 1126 (1959).
181. 39 F.2d 540 (2d. Cir. 1930).
182. Application of this rule is apparently within the discretion of the court and
cannot be compelled, see Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1957), although
Cohan itself might be read otherwise. See generally Gluck, How Cohan Works: Allow€-
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pound the administrative difficulty created by the initial adoption of the "sub-
stantiality" text 8 3
Although distinguishing between regular dues payments and special assess-
ments for a specific political purpose raises administrative problems too, the
distinction appears justifiable. Customary business league political-legislative
activities, for which regular dues payments provide adequate support, are like-
ly to furnish helpful information to the legislature which could not well be
obtained elsewhere.8 4 High pressure tactics undertaken to influence a partic-
ular bill will less often be financed through regular dues. 85 In administering
the distinction the history of past dues payments should afford a sound meas-
ure of "regular," 8 6 and the contributor could be required to assume the bur-
den of showing that departures from historic dues levels are not in fact special
assessments for new lobbying programs.
Admittedly, this distinction might permit a far-sighted trade association to
evade the regulatory proscription by maintaining a sufficiently high level of
regular dues to accumulate a war chest, insuring against unusual outlays for
subsequent political drives and obviating special assessments. This possibility
suggests an extension of the Cammaraw analogy to section 501 (c) 3 organi-
zations, which, under section 504(a), are denied exemption "if the amounts
ance of gHsiness Expense Deductions When No Exact Records Are Kept, 6 RuTOEs L
REv. 375 (1952).
183. Administrative difficulties might be largely avoided by ignoring marginal legislative
activities in fixing a percentage. But, since most of the legislative activities of a particular
business league may be marginal--ostensibly for public relations or education-adoption
of this approach might negate the effectiveness of proportionate disallowance. See, e.g.,
H.R. REp. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (The NAM's .2 million public relations
campaign claimed to be totally unrelated to legislation).
184. Business leagues, along with comparable groups, fill at least in part a need
created by territorial, rather than functional, representation. See BLAmSEU., Amnucm.
DzsocRAcY UzDER PREssuRn 67 (1957). Their routine legislative activities consist for
the most part of providing legislators with information and educating their own members.
See Lenhart & Schriftgiesser, Management in Politics, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 32, at 36-37;
H.R1 REP. No. 3138,81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1950) ; S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
42-48 (1957).
185. Specific legislation often demands intensified effort and more money to support
it. H.R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950). This %as apparently true in
Canzinarmw since the expenditures denied deductibility were in the nature of assessments
made by a tax-exempt trade association, see note 173 supra, and it has been true in most
cases involving payments to business leagues, see, e.g., Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Com-
missioner, 84 F2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936); Mosby Hotel Co., 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 920
(1954); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 147, 181-82 (1945).
186. Dues are ordinarily assessed at the rate of X dollars a year or according to a
standarized sliding scale. HR. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950). Thus, for
example, the income of the American Medical Association (strictly speaking, a "pro-
fessional" rather than a "business" group, see note 26 supra) has for some years been
derived principally from $25 annual dues, while the National Milk Producers Federation's
dues are based on butterfat marketed by their members. S. RE,. No. 395, 85th Cong., Ist
Sess. 46-7 (1957). Variations from such mechanically standardized levels could be easily
detected.
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accumulated out of income during the taxable year or any prior taxable year
and not actually paid out 'by the end of the taxable year... are umreasonable
in amount or duration" in order to carry out the function on which the exemp-
tion is based.' 8 7 The test under this section has been whether the accumulating
organization has a reasonable and concrete plan for the use of the accumula-
tions in carrying out the functions on which its exemption is 'based.188 Appli-
cation of the same test ito section 501(c)6 organizations to circumscribe
accumulation of a lobbying fund out of regular dues payments would seem
preferable to across-the-board disallowance of regular business league dues
insofar as they are devoted to legislative-political activities.
In accordance with Cammarano and the "tax equilibrium" concept, it might
be argued that a business league should be taxed on the amount of money
which it expends for legislative-political purposes. These amounts represent
expenditures for legislative activity just as much as did the contributions in-
volved in Textile Mills."") Such taxation would, however, limit the exemption
of these organizations on grounds other than those specifically stated in the
Code, contradicting section 501(c)6 as an expression of congressional intent.
Nonexempt Single-Enterprise Activities
The single enterprise, especially the large corporation, often constitutes a
highly effective pressure group in its own right, 9 0 and, to the extent that
expenditures through multienterprise channels are inhibited by post-Camnia-
rano enforcement, this form of activity may be expected to increase. The in-
dividual enterprise often makes use of its own personnel and facilities; an
office in Washington or in the state capital may be occupied by a skilled
lobbyist permanently employed ,by 'the firm; public relations personnel on its
staff may direct legislative activities; and executives may speak at public
functions and contact legislators or officials.' 9' Or the enterprise may employ
outsiders such as a law firm, an advertising or public relations organization,
or a professional lobbyist. 92 Furthermore, the enterprise may direct extensive
187. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 504(a).
188. Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
189. For example, in 1948 the American Medical Association engaged a public re-
lations firm to guide its campaign against compulsory health-insurance legislation. S. REI.
No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1957). Ignoring, as did the Camnarano court, the con-
tingent-fee arrangement in Textile Mills, these AMA expenses were functionally identical
with some of the expenditures denied deductibility in Textile Mills. 358 U.S. at 503-04.
190. See H.R. REP. No. 3239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1951).
191. The congressional investigation of efforts by the Natural Gas Industry t, in-
fluence the Harris-Fulbright Bill revealed many instances of this type of corporate activity.
S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1957) (Socony Mobil Oil Co.); id. at
22 (Standard Oil Company of California which maintains a Washington office with i
staff of twelve to fifteen employees one of whom is registered under the Lobbying Act);
id. at 24 (Shell Oil Co.).
192. In 1958, for example, Covington & Burling and Weaver & Glassie, two law firms,
registered under the Lobbying Act as representatives of American Can Co. and Atlantic
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propaganda activities to members of its own community--employees, stock-
holders, credit-card holders, customers-in an effort to stimulate them to adopt
its position and put pressure on legislators or public officials.1 13
All such activities could be logically comprehended within the Camniarano
policy; indeed, if they were not, avoidance of that policy would, at least by
the larger corporation, be relatively easy. But the regulations before the Cans-
marano Court w ere not "consistently construed" to reach expenditures for
such activities; the Treasury has seldom attempted to deny their deductibil-
ity 1'4 and, in one relatively recent case, was rebuffed by the Tax Court in
such an attempt. In 1954 the court upheld a corporate taxpayer's claimed
deduction of amounts expended by its president in connection with two trips
to the state capital, one at the legislature's request, to testify before a com-
mittee. 0 5 The only Treasury denials of deductions for single-enterprise poli-
tical activities regularly upheld -have involved expenditures closely akin to
bribery which would be disallowed irrespective of Ca~imiarano.00
Apart from the absence of a consistent construction to afford a firm basis
for the invocation of the reenactment doctrine, other arguments are available
for not extending Cammarano to single-enterprise expenditures. Just as con-
spiracies are viewed as more socially undesirable than individual behavior in
antitrust and criminal law, concerted activities by several businesses in the
political arena might warrant harsher tax treatment and justify the adminis-
trative difficulties of enforcing the Camizarano rule of nondeductibility. 107
Refining Co. respectively. 15 CONG. Q. AL.2A"AC 691-92 (1959). And several ex-Con-
gressmen registered as lobbyists for particular enterprises. Id. at 687-88. For further
examples, see 14 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 630 (1958).
193. See S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-27 (1957); Wood, Corporate
Political Activity, 15 Bus. LAw. 112, 114 (1959).
194. See Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1931) (payments to attorney
employed to bring about the defeat of legislation adverse to taxpayer's business held de-
ductible); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947) (payments to attorney retained
to keep taxpayer informed as to possible legislative action held nondeductible); G. T.
Wofford, 15 B.T.A. 1225 (1929) (payments to attorney employed to forestall passage of
gasoline inspection law held deductible).
195. Smokey Mountains Beverage Co., 22 T.C. 1249 (1954) (expenditures of cor-
porate president incurred for twro trips to state capital; one at the legislature's request, the
other to compare a bill with similar bills in other states). The Tax Court appears to have
formulated a distinction between e-penditures of "legal" and "illegal" businesses. Compare
Sinokey Mountains with Stralla, mspra note 194 (expenses of gambling enterprise).
196. See, e.g., Rugel v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942) (payments to
personal friend of state administrator to obtain state business) ; Harden Mortgage Loan
Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1943) (amounts paid to partnership a
member of which was the majority leader of the state legislature to exert political
influence).
197. This rationale for limitation of nondeductibility to expenditures for concerted
lobbying activity is suggested by recent decisions involvng the application of the anti-
trust laws to concerted lobbying activities. Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 170
F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1959); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. President's
Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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When several enterprises combine to form an organization to influence gov-
ernment policy, they may successfully conceal their identity and their finan-
cial or partisan interests behind the organizational front; the single enterprise,
by contrast, will have considerable difficulty obtaining anonymity. In addition,
the single enterprise will not be able to avail itself of the benefits of coordina-
tion of effort and pooling of resources which make multienterprise activities
a more widespread and effective means of achieving legislative-political goals.
In addition, contributions to an outside organization, the declared goals of
which will often characterize contributions to it as expended for political-
legislative activities and which could be required to disclose the source of its
contributions,198 are more easily identifiable than are individual-enterprise
expenditures, which may be buried in accounts for operating expenses such as
salaries and public relations.
Of course, excepting single-enterprise activities from the rule of nondeduct-
ibility might well lead to attempted evasion through multienterprise coor-
dination different only in form from that involved in Camnzarano. Single cor-
porations might act in concert with minimal direction from a trade association
(requiring no increase in dues) and maintain the outward indicia of individual
action. But such a parallel pattern of activity could hardly achieve 'both maxi-
mum effectiveness and secrecy; to the extent that the firms sought the advan-
tages of combination, they would risk detection and nondeductibility.
If, however, Cammarano is extended to single-enterprise expenditures, the
Treasury might attempt to solve administrative problems much as it has dealt
with the problem of excessive expense-account deductions. 10 Corporations
might be required to render a detailed separate accounting of all legislative-
political expenditures as defined by the regulations.200 But since the definitions
in the regulations are necessarily far from precise, the enterprise could, in
most instances, claim that questioned expenditures were not for a political-
legislative purpose. Little reason exists to suspect that more detailed regula-
tions could successfully prevent the burying of political expenses in accounts
for operating expenses. 2
0
'
198. The informational return, form 990(a), filed by § 501(c)3 organizations
requests this information. Hearings Before the Special Committee To Investigate Tax-
Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 439
(1954). The need for the information to enforce the "tax equilibrium" policy and the
fact that returns are confidential, INT. Rzv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 6103, 7213(a), would avoid
possible constitutional problems, cf. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 362 U.S. 60 (1960):
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 849 (1960).
199. Corporate income tax forms have been expanded to include a list of questions
answers to which will presumably flag possible excessive use of expense accounts. 6
CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAx REP. ff 6245 (1960); 12 J. TAxATioN 141 (1960).
200. Although such questions might elicit information relative to the most obvious
political-legislative expenditures, because of definitional difficulties the large amounts spent
for marginal legislative activities-"education of the public"-would probably not be
mentioned.
201. The problem is analogous to that involved in attempts to prohibit corporate
contributions for federal election campaigns. These attempts, embodied in the Federal Cor-
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CONCLUSION
Read most 'broadly, Canimarano would extend to all of the situations and
combinations thereof which have been discussed; a more narrow reading must
rest upon often tenuous distinctions. The Court could most logically limit the
rule of nondeductibility -by holding it inapplicable to expenditures designed to
influence the administrative and executive stage of the political process, to
expenditures for general propaganda activities not expressly linked to pending
legislation, to expenditures by the individual enterprise, and to all contribu-
tions or payments to organizations which have been exempted under sections
501(c) 6 and 501(c) 3. The desirability of so limiting the rule depends upon
the weight to be accorded the policies competing with that of Cammarano.
Considerations concerning efficient administration of the tax laws would
seem to conflict with a broad extension of Cammarano. Such extension prob-
ably would not produce much additional revenue because it would have a
relatively insignificant effect upon total taxable income. It would place the
Treasury increasingly in -the role of enforcing an essentially nonrevenue policy
in which it may have less expertise and which may detract from its tax-col-
lecting functions. Furthermore, it is questionable whether even the most pains-
taldng policing of business expenses could be successful in achieving "tax
equilibrium" with political-legislative expenses unrelated to trades or busi-
nesses. Even if the Treasury, supported by the Court, elects to challenge the
deductibility of expenditures routed through all of the channels which have
been discussed businesses may be able successfully to disguise these payments.
For example, they may be able to make payments in kind--either company
facilities or the time of staff personnel m--or compensation in the form of
salaries, -bonuses, or expense accounts may be paid on the understanding that
the recipients will individually make such payments.20 In short, the imagina-
tion of the businessman may prove a formidable opponent for the diligence
of the tax collector. Finally, even the most diligent enforcement may founder
on definitional problems because the types of expenditures for which deducti-
bility would be disallowed under a broad reading of Cammarano are especial-
ly unresponsive to precise characterization.
A broad reading of Cammnarano would also conflict with a policy of maxi-
mizing the flow of information and ideas within the body politic and to the
organs of government. Many have contended that business groups should be
encouraged rather than discouraged from making their views known to the
rupt Practices Act, have "hardly dented corporate influence on federal elections" according
to Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided
Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 995 (1953).
202. Firms in the natural gas industry contributed both employee's time and company
facilities to organizations formed to conduct the campaign to promote the Harris-Fulbright
Bill. S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-27 (1957).
203. Cf. McKEAN, PARry AND PREsuRE POLiTICs 353 (1949) ; MEXmAIm & Gos.m.L,
THE AmERCAN PA= Sys -' 406 (4th ed. 1949).
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electorate and to legislators, administrators, and executives. Only when the
public and responsible officials are fully informed concerning the potential im-
pact of alternative policies upon interest groups most directly affected, it is
said, can a government based upon consent function most effectively. 20 4 With
increasing government intervention in the economy, the views of businessmen
may 'be more necessary than ever to assist Congress and the Administration
in tailoring their policies to the needs of a complex economic system.
An alternative approach, more in harmony with this objective of maximiz-
ing the flow of information and ideas, would be to redress the disequilibrium
between political-legislative expenses which fit the mold of business expenses
and those which do not -by increasing the deductibility of the latter. The im-
balance could be partially restored by a liberal interpretation or abolition of
the section 501 (c) 3 limitation on political activity.205 Thus organizations, con-
tributions to which are generally not deductible as business expenses such as,
the American Civil Liberties Union or the NAACP which are denied exemp-
tion under section 501 (c) 3 because of this limitation,20 0 could receive deduct-
ible contributions on an equal footing with business leagues and trade asso-
ciations. Alternatively, or in addition, all taxpayers could be allowed to deduct
up to a specified amount for political activities from their individual returns,
putting them on a par with the businessman who would then be allowed to
set off expenses for political activities against earnings.20 This approach to
"tax equilibrium" might be more successful than the Camnzarano policy of
limiting business deductions because of the problems inherent in implementing
that policy.
On the other hand, it could be persuasively argued that the revenue laws
afford an improper means for dealing with problems of private influence on
the political process,20 8 problems which warrant more than the piecemeal treat-
204. See Celler, Pressure Groups in Congress, Annals, Sept. 1958, p. 1; Lenhart &
Schriftgiesser, Managemnent in Politics, id. at 32.
205. Devine, Pioneers or Propagandists?, 29 Suavsv GRAri, c 348 (1940).
206. See J. T. & Emma Lowe, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 451 (1952). Contributions to
the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the NAACP, a separate subsidiary, are, how-
ever, deductible. Comment, 58 YAIE L.J. 574, 581 (1949) ; 102 CONG. REC. 15030 (1950)
(remarks of Sen. Stennis).
207. A bill to accomplish this for certain amounts contributed for federal election
campaigns was recently introduced. H.R. 1980, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CoNG. REC.
377 (1959). Numerous similar proposals have been introduced in the past. See, e.g.,
S. 2302, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CoxG. REc. 9057 (1955) (proposing a $100 ceiling) ;
S. 2497, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REc. 10277 (1955) ($50 ceiling); H.R. 9558,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CONG. Rm 3423 (1956). For a discussion of these and other
proposals, see Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incentives for Small Cdntributors,
18 LA. L. REv. 414 (1958).
208. The purpose of the tax laws is not, after all, to reform men's moral characters.
50 CONG. REC. 3849, 3850, 4613 (1913). Three bills have been submitted to Congress to
overrule Cantmarano by amending the Internal Revenue Code to permit tax deduction for
certain "lawful" lobbying expenditures. H.R. 7123, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CoNo. RxC.
7378 (daily ed. May 14, 1959) ; H.R. 10272, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 2093
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ment accorded them by the current pattern of statute and judicial decision.
According to this view, "tax equilibrium" in the political realm, pursued by
denying business deductions or by increasing nonbusiness deductions, is an
unrealistic objective; it raises virtually insoluble administrative problems,
places the Treasury in an inappropriate role, and removes incentives for more
comprehensive means of dealing with the problem. After considering these
alternative means at great length,2 0 D Congress decided upon a procedure re-
quiring full disclosure-the Regulation of Lobbying Act.210 Rather than sup-
plement this act through tax policy, the registration and disclosure require-
ments on both state and national levels could be broadened.211 Thus, abuses
could be remedied without tampering with the Internal Revenue Code and
without inhibiting the flow of information and ideas.
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 1960) ; H.R. 10502, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 CoxG. Rrc. 2592 (daily ed.
Feb. 17, 1960). See 18 ConG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 572 (1960).
209. See S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1957).
210. See note 206 supra.
211. See Zeller, The Federal Regulations of Lobbying Act, 42 A. PoL Sci. R v. 239
(1948).
